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INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, a great body of information was published about efforts to
reform the judiciary in Latin America.1 Billions of dollars in foreign aid
from government and non-government organizations (NGO) have been di-
rected into judicial reform projects in developing nations-at times, with
less than stellar results? Experts leading the aid projects insist their efforts
have brought about a new dawn of legal justice, political stability, and re-
form in the region. However, books like Mentiras de la Reforma Judicial
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1. See e.g., Edgardo Buscaglia, Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 17
POL'Y STUD. 273 (1996); JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (Malcom Rowat et al. eds.,
1995); Edgardo Buscaglia et al., Judicial Reform in Latin America: A Framework for Na-
tional Development, in ESSAY IN PUBLIC POLICY 21 (1995); Edgardo Buscaglia, An Analysis
of Corrupt Practices Within the Judiciary in Latin America, in IV ESSAYS IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 223 (Claus Ott & George Von Wangenhem eds., 1998); LINN HAMMERGREN, THE
POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (1998) [hereinafter POLITICS OF
JUSTICE]; JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORLD BANK CONFERENCE (Malcom Rowat et al. eds., 1995); Linn A. Hammergren, Fifteen
Years of Judicial Reform in Latin America: Where We Are and Why We Haven't Made More
Progress (visited Oct. 1998) <http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-caguirre/papers.htm>; HUGO
FRUHLING, JUDICIAL REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA (Felipe Aguerro &
Jeffrey Starks eds., 1998).
2. See Charles Roberts, Rule of Law and Development: USAID and the Public Order
Courts of Colombia (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Georgetown University).
For criticism on judicial reform in Latin America see GABRIEL PELAEZ GANTIER, MENTIRAS
DE LA REFORMA JUDICIAL (Tupak Katari ed., 1995); FRANCISCO ELISEO ORTIZ RUIz, Diez Aaios
de Reforma Judicial en El Salvador, 1985-1995, in APROXIMACI6N DE UN DIAGNOSTICO
(1997); JAVIER HENAO HIDRON, NUEVA REFORMA JUDICIAL (1989); CARLOS TOVAR
GUTZLAFF, REFORMA ESTRUCTURAL DEL PODER JUDICIAL (1989).
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(Judicial Reform Lies), statistics,3 and numerous writings by Latin American
authors," leave us wondering if the programs adopted to reform the judiciary
have truly been successful. Furthermore, the picture of success depicted by
judicial reform professionals completely contrasts the one painted by Hu-
man Rights watchdogs.'
The lack of political stability and failure to achieve real democracy was
the justification for seeking judicial reform throughout Latin America. Now,
one wonders if judiciary reform is to blame for the lack of socioeconomic
development and persistent violence. One of the indicators of the ineffi-
ciency of judicial systems in Latin America is the number of sentenced pris-
oners. In 1998, in spite of judicial reform programs, "on average, 70 per-
cent of all prisoners in Latin America and the Caribbean [were] awaiting
sentencing."6
The character of Latin American judiciaries is questionable. To placate
the first world countries sending aid their way, Latin American countries
have played the judicial reform game to a dexterous effect, bringing in mil-
lions of dollars to the judiciary, that would otherwise be unavailable from
internal sources. However, judges, prosecutors, and affected citizens wonder
what became of the millions of dollars in foreign aid, and of the training in-
tended to improve the quality of their work, as well as their working condi-
tions.' Latin Americans' displeasure with their justice systems is evident,
although there is palpable ambivalence among the 'establishment.' 8 Yet, it is
not clear if "the widespread complaints constitute a mandate and basis for
further reform, let alone, for the conventional current efforts."9 A negative
answer "does not invalidate the reformers' objectives. It will make their
work more difficult and recommends a reexamination of their goals and the
means they have selected to achieve them."'"
Problems with Latin American judiciaries have fueled a lucrative con-
sulting industry in the United States." As a matter of fact, a judicial reform
3. "In Argentina, only 13% of the public has anything good to say about the judiciary; in
Peru, 92% distrust the judges; in Brazil, 79% distrust the justice system." IDB Am6rica, The
History of an Orphaned Institution (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.iadb.org
/exr/IDB/stories/ 1999/eng/e 1299sl .htm>.
4. See generally PELAEZ, supra note 2; Ruiz, supra note 2; HIDR6N, supra note 2;
GUTZLAFF, supra note 2.
5. For a discussion on the United States Agency for International Development Admini-
stration of Justice/Rule of Law program in Colombia in the early 1990s see Charles Roberts,
and Development: USAID and the Public Order Courts of Colombia, supra note 2; Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights Report, Colombia: Public Order, Private Injustice (Feb. 1994);
GERARDO MOLINA, JUSTICIA SIN RosTRo: ESTUDIO SOBRE LA JUSTICIA REGIONAL (1996).
6. IDB Amdrica, supra note 3.
7. This information was obtained by the author from many interviews conducted in Co-
lombia during June and July of 1999.
8. See IDB Am6rica, supra note 3.
9. HAMMERGREN, POLITICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 5.
10. id.
11. Consulting organizations active in Latin America include the National Center for
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project is underway, has been recently completed, or is currently in the
planning stages in nearly every Latin American country." All of the reform
projects are based on the premise that something is terribly wrong and needs
to be fixed. The numerous reform efforts and their failures indicate "the se-
riousness of the situation and the difficulty of its resolution. They also sug-
gest that, while bad reforms can be worse than no reform at all, society's pa-
tience can run out."' 3
In support of democracy in Latin America, court consultants and or-
ganizations who butter their bread with justice reform Requests for Propos-
als (RFP), jump at any opportunity to win contracts from government agen-
cies tasked with carrying out the policies of the United States. 4 And in the
off chance that there is not a particular problem to be fixed, one can easily
be manufactured by either government officials of the United States seeking
personal enrichment through foreign aid, or abroad by over-enthusiastic
NGO in need of justifying the salaries of senior staffers. "In many instances
in Latin America, judiciaries do not instigate reform, but they do have pro-
posals, often calling for more money and independence."" Money is the
lynchpin that motivates many officials to find ways to enrich themselves
and the elite social class which continues to control representative democ-
racy in Latin America. 6
The focus of this article is not to discuss the many judicial reform ef-
forts undertaken in Latin America, because to do so would be to go over
ground that has already been adequately covered by many capable analysts.
Rather, the purpose of this article, which draws substantially on the author's
experience as a former Colombian judge, is to examine not just the judici-
ary, but the historical, political, and cultural factors inherited from colonial
Spanish domination which are still embedded in Latin American countries.
All of these factors affect the judicial systems of Latin America, making
them dysfunctional which requires more than just reforming the judiciary
for meaningful change to occur.' As such, the reforms must be sweeping
State Courts, DPK Consultants, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, USAID,
WOLA, and others.
12. See generally Buscaglia et al., Judicial Reform in Latin America: A Framework for
National Development, supra note 1.
13. HAMMERGREN, POLITICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 4.
14. Judicial reforms projects started in Latin America in the early 1990s when the United
States invested in these programs. See id.
15. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Promoting Rule-of-Law Reform: Les-
sons from Latin America ": A Conversation with Linn Hammergren, USAID (visited Nov. 30,
1999) <http://www.ceip.org/programs/democr/jreformihtm>.
16. The current exception is that of Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez who is seen as a
radical reformer and an outsider. President Chavez won a populist election in December of
1998. See Venezuelan Democracy Quivers, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 2, 1999, at B8.
17. The author was a district judge in Medellin, Columbia from 1983-1986.
18. One could argue that the judiciary in Latin America has been made a scapegoat for
the corruption and excesses of the other two branches. Additionally, one can also argue that
the other two branches consider the judiciary to be a potential "cash cow" able to attract
20001
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reforms of political, social, and cultural character.
I. THE LEGACY OF THE PAST
It has been said that, "[aln effective government requires functioning
legal and judicial institutions to accomplish the interrelated goals of promot-
ing private sector development, encouraging development .of all other socie-
tal institutions, alleviating poverty and consolidating democracy."' 9 As a re-
sult of the legacy of its colonial past, Latin America has been burdened
more than many developing regions of the globe by its past in which the
autocratic caprices of Iberian monarchies pillaged a fertile and abundant
land for the sake of religious zealousness and strategic hegemony over other
Old World rivals.'0 Five hundred years after Europeans began the conquest
of the New World, Latin America continues to struggle with its demons,
namely, rule by white and criollo' oligarchies intent on preserving a status
quo characterized by a rigid class consciousness.
Colonial and post-colonial Latin American governments and economies
were founded on mercantile systems. The notion of representative democ-
racy, featuring a judiciary capable of enforcing universal and constitutional
rights for all citizens, was of little importance to the elite who grew rich and
entrenched in positions of power and influence. However, as mercantile
economies yielded in this century to violent rebellion, social and labor un-
rest, economic depression, and dwindling natural resources, Latin Amer-
ica's elite were forced to redefine their government structures in order to
preserve the status quo and ensure continuation of their influence over their
fellow countrymen. 3 Furthermore, the elite, faced with threats from leftist
ideologies and recognizing the opportunities to be bestowed upon them by
industrialization and strategic alliances with their powerful neighbor to the
north, elected to wholeheartedly embrace market economies and representa-
tive democracy-at least at face value. 4 Latin America refused to be left out
badly needed money into the government.
19. Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean- Elements
of Reform (World Bank, 1996).
20. 'The judges from Spain and Portugal were, for the most part, an integral part of the
conquering army. Almost three centuries later, Latin American judges have yet to overcome
this image." T. Leigh Anenson, For Whom the Bell Tolls ... Judicial Selection by Election in
Latin America, 4 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 261,291 (1997).
21. Criollos or creoles were originally distinguished as pure-blooded Spanish and Portu-
guese born in the New World of European-born parents. Over the centuries, the term came to
represent members of an upper class whose bloodlines had little if any traceable Indian or
African ancestry. The distinction is important in Latin American countries where one's name
and membership in the elite class determines one's future success in the powerful oligarchies
that exert dominant control in politics, business, and education. See generally BRIAN M.
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of the economic development and prosperity. However, if economic reforms
toward wealth were to take place, it stood to reason that government institu-
tions had to support economic changes. Such changes began in earnest in
the 1980s when experiments in leftist2" and rightist26 totalitarian rule began
to unravel. By the end of the decade, it became widely recognized that eco-
nomic development and free market enterprise flourish in societies with sta-
ble, equitable, and respectable courts.27 International and national investors
as well as private individuals enter into contracts more willingly in countries
where the judiciary addresses problems efficiently and justly.
Free and robust markets can thrive only in a political system where in-
dividual freedoms and property rights are accorded respect and where re-
dress for violations of such rights can be found in fair and equitable courts.2"
In Latin American States, the judicial system does not occupy an equal foot-
ing among the three branches of representative democracy (judiciary, execu-
tive, and legislative). The brutal truth is that the judiciary has long been lit-
tle more than a maidservant-a Cinderella to the other branches of
government."'
A. Evolution of the Modem Latin American Judiciary
The Spanish granted little opportunity of self-rule to the New World?
Every government decision was made by the Monarchy through the aus-
pices of the Council of Indies (Council).' The members of the Council
served as an administrative board, legislative branch, and an appeals court
all at the same time.32 The will of the Council and that of the Crown was re-
alized in the New World by viceroys, the provincial governors whose pri-
mary responsibility was to act as agents of the Crown and carry out royal
25. For example, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti de Liberacion
National (FMLN) in El Salvador. See generally KATHERINE HOYT, THE MANY FACES OF
SANDINISTA DEMOCRACY (1997).
26. For example, regimes such as Pinochet's in Chile, Noriega's in Panama, Stroessner's
in Paraguay, and the military junta in Argentina. See generally Ruth Wedgwood, Interna-
tional Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829 (2000); A.M. Weisburd,
Implications of International Relations Theory for the International Law of Human Rights,
38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 45 (1999).
27. The judiciary of industrialized nations was also more stable, respectable, and effi-
cient.
28. See Maria Dakolias, A Strategy of Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin Amer-
ica, 36 VA. J. INT'LL. 167, 168 (1985).
29. For a thorough study of the history of the judiciary in Latin America see 10 MODERN
LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA (Kenneth Robert Redden & Linda L. Schlueter eds., 1991).
30. This discussion also generally applies to the Portuguese experience in the New
World.
31. The Council of Indies was a body of noblemen advisors to the Spanish Crown. See
generally Ali Friedberg, Reconsidering the Doctrine of Discovery: Spanish Land Acquisition
in Mexico (1521-1821), 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 87 (1999).
32. See generally DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN
SPITE OF ITSELF 10 (1993). "
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policy, regardless of the needs of the colonists and native people. In this ca-
pacity, the viceroys also performed the duties of the high court in the colo-
nies,33 and in times of fiscal or political crisis, "they assumed supreme ex-
ecutive authority as well as judicial authority."' This demonstrates the
intertwined relationship between executive and judicial power from the ear-
liest days of colonial expansion. By reviewing the acts of the royal officers
in the colonies, the audiencias assumed a type of appellate power to protect
royal prerogatives." The audiencias "improved access to [the] judicial ser-
vice for the Indies population,"' 6 but the colonies remained far from self-
determination in matters of judicial affairs. Locally, the alcaldes were judi-
cially elected or appointed authorities who "exercised regular civil and
criminal jurisdictions within their municipal boundaries."' 7 The decisions of
the Alcaldes were subject to review by the audiencias. In municipalities
with a predominantly indigenous population, indigenous judges were
elected in order to introduce the aborigines to the Spanish municipal institu-
tions. 8
The decades preceding rebellion against the Spanish Crown were char-
acterized by the tightening of central control by the Crown over the colo-
nies. This was in part due to the dwindling resources and fiscal crisis
brought on by ongoing warfare between colonial powers. The fiscal imbal-
ance was addressed mostly by reinforcing the monarchy's absolute powers
and by further centralizing decisionmaking in the central bureaucracy. There
was also an accentuation of the exceedingly regulated management of the
economy and polity. This institutional framework did not encourage fiscal
soundness in the end, nor, did it create an environment conducive to in-
creased productivity and wealth creation.
After the revolt of the Netherlands and the decline in the inflow of revenues from
the Indies, this framework generated a vicious cycle of chronic fiscal imbalance,
bankruptcy, and insecure property rights (resulting from the increasing need for
confiscation and the arbitrary and ubiquitous role of the central bureaucracy). An-
other result was a fragile judiciary, which continued its ultimate dependence on
the monarch's authority and was perceived mostly as an enforcer of an ever-
growing body of statutory and administrative directives.' 9
This distrust of the judiciary by citizens in the emerging nations in
Latin America persisted through the succession of juntas and caudillos (rul-
33. See Luz E. Nagle, Evolution of the Colombian Judiciary and the Constitutional
Court, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 62, 63 (1995).
34. BUSHNELL, supra note 32, at 29.
35. See id. Audiencias were a tribunal that assisted the viceroy and acted as a check on
the viceroy's power. See generally Friedberg, supra note 31.
36. Felipe Saez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some Stra-
tegic Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (1998).
37. Id. at 1277.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 1280.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2000], Art. 20
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol30/iss2/20
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
ing strongmen and coalitions) 0 that characterize the decades following in-
dependence. The courts were thought to enforce the authority of the ruling
elite, rather than to equitably interpret the laws of the land, this regardless of
the fact that "Latin American countries rigorously adopted the prescriptions
of the separation of powers doctrine, aimed at protecting both the executive
and legislative branches from immoderate judicial interference.""' The result
was that judges had little, if any, authority to issue legal edicts or interpreta-
tions without the fear of reprisal from the executive and legislative branches
and from the omnipresent church authority.
The inquisitorial system of ecclesiastic justice upon which the state
criminal justice system of the New World was founded, was secretive and
malevolent. The intricacies of religious dogma, zealotry, and obedience to a
higher authority resulted in persecutions and great depredations against citi-
zens. The Milanese jurist Cesare Beccaria Bonesana railed against such dep-
redations. 2 In his treatise, Of Crimes and Punishment,3 Beccaria denounced
the excess of the criminal system and the abuses of the judges to whom Bec-
caria referred as "despotic tyrants.""
40. See generally Friedberg, supra note 31.
.41. Garcia, supra note 36, at 1283.
42. Cesare Beccaria Bonesana was born in Milan on March 15, 1738 and died on No-
vember 28, 1794. He was a marquis whose life was influenced by the incidents of his time,
particularly privileges of power to the nobility (high bureaucracy). Nobles were the interme-
diaries between the monarch and the rest of the society. They controlled and governed the
judiciary and public institutions (the councils or, as in Spain, consejos). These noble interme-
diaries were very corrupt. See FRANCISCO TOMAS, Introduction to CtSAR BECCARIA, DE LOS
DELrros Y DE LAS PENAS (2d ed. 1976).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 78. Some of the principles advocated by Beccaria include:
Only the law can determine the punishment of crimes.
Judges in criminal cases have no right to interpret the law because they are not
legislators. Only legislators have the authority, as representatives of all of society,
to make laws. As such, the code is to be observed in its literal sense, and nothing
more is left to the judge than to determine if an action conforms to the written law.
Hence, the authority to make criminal law and decide the punishment of crimes
resides with the legislator.
There is a principle of legality, nullum crime sine lege and nulla poena sine lege.
A person could not be punished without prior definition of that conduct as being
criminal. Laws must be clear and simple to avoid the need for interpretation. Con-
sequently, the greater the number of people understanding the laws the less fre-
quent the crimes.
Criminal justice must be public. Evidence must be clear and rational, and torture
should be eliminated.
Witnesses should not be presented in secret. There should be corroborating wit-
nesses to determine their credibility and prove the crime. It is necessary to have
more than one witness because while one affirms and the other negates, there is
nothing truthful. The right that each man must be believed innocent prevails.
Secret accusations must be banned. Such a custom makes men false and cowardly.
Who is able to defend himself from slander when that person is armed with the
strongest shield of tyranny-secrecy?
Everyone should be equal before the law (this was in reaction to the nobility being
2000]
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In much of Latin America, the inquisitorial system of criminal justice
would persist in its most repulsive forms well into the ninetieth century."5
For instance, in the emerging nation of Colombia, the secretive criminal
courts, known as the Santo Oficio, were not abolished until the adoption of
the Constitution of 1821." In fact, judgment by one's peers would not be
implemented until the adoption of the Constitution of 185 L" During that the
intervening thirty years the only system in place was purely inquisitorial and
highly distrusted by the people.
Further complicating the emergence of a respected judicial authority,
was the political patronage and turmoil plaguing Latin America after inde-
pendence. This was characterized by constant military intervention, and a
series of governments run by strongmen (these governments were called
juntas)," which were struggling to establish a political authority favoring
one or another ideology or oligarchic structure. During this period, instead
of the judiciary being the objective branch and balancing and neutralizing
the power of the political branches, it became their servant.
In Latin America, the forces for change did not generate the type of insti-
tutional transformation effectively brought about in post-Revolution North
America. As a matter of fact, no revalorization of the individual vis-a-vis
the State took place. There was no development of effective checks and
balances among the branches of government, and popular participation in
political decision making, and judicial processes was not encouraged. In-
stead, after achieving independence, Latin American countries maintained
the authoritarian institutional structure of colonial times. Kinship net-
works, political influence, and family prestige prevailed over clear and
stable rules.49
The struggle to establish executive authority is evidenced by the many
constitutions that were written and re-written in the fledgling nations during
the last two centuries. Colombia and Peru have each had no less than thir-
accorded deferential treatment).
Punishment should be proportional to the crime.
The death penalty is unjust.
Id. at 78; JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN
AMERICAN LEGAL SYsTEMs 67, 140 (1978).
45.
Judges did not 'make law' by issuing verdicts that were then used as precedents by
other judges; rather, they were expected to merely apply statutes that had been de-
fined by legal scholars and passed by national legislators .... In criminal cases,
judges had what is called an 'inquisitorial' role, where they both conducted the
criminal investigation and issued a verdict. Public defenders and prosecutors had
limited or nonexistent roles.
Inter-American Development Bank (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.iadb.org/exr>.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See generally Friedberg, supra note 3 1.
49. Garcia, supra note 36, at 1267.
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teen constitutions, and Brazil has had ten constitutions.' The Latin Ameri-
can courts are rendered largely incapable of exerting judicial independence
because of the many constitutional changes.
Historically, Latin American judiciaries have been less than an institu-
tional player. Their political role has been one of concern over "which par-
ties or which individuals dominate institutions and so influence specific de-
cisions and actions."'" The judiciary is used as a pawn in conflicts among
political and economic elites, 2 with judges often the recipients of political
favors. 3 The courts have long been filled with political appointments 5 ow-
ing their loyalty to individual presidents and political parties. Higher Court
judges by and large come from the same oligarchic circles, and share the
same economic and class interests.55 Contrary to conventional wisdom, the
political elites have not minimized the influence of politics in the judiciary.
In reality, politics influence the judiciary and the judiciary influences poli-
tics. 6 This intricate political choreography was intended to maintain the
equilibrium between the dominant political parties to the point that, if a
judge belonged to one political party, the judge's secretary must be a mem-
ber of the opposition party. 7 A judge's ability to stay on the bench or be
promoted has been largely predicated on maintaining political alliances
rather than on qualification and competence.58 Even if the Higher Court
50. See generally Alfredo Quispe Correa, The Evolution of Religious Beliefs in a Consti-
tutional Text, B.Y.U. L. REv. 357 (1998); Jacob Dolinger, Brazilian Supreme Court Solu-
tions for Conflicts Between Domestic and International Law: An Exercise in Eclecticism, 20
CAP. U. L. REv. 1041 (1993).
51. See HAMMERGREN, POLMCS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 25. Hammergren calls this
"micropolitics" in contrast to "macropolitics" which he defines as having to do with struc-
tural biases and the balance of institutional powers within a political system. See id.
52. See id. According to Hammergren, historically, the fluctuations in the Latin Ameri-
can judiciary's political role often had been at the micro level. Traditional concerns with par-
ties or which individuals dominated institutions and so influenced specific decisions and ac-
tions. See id.
53. See Inter-American Development Bank, Would You Trust This Court? (visited Nov.
30, 1999) <http://www.iadb.org/exr.htm>.
54. Election to the bench by popular vote is nearly non-existent.
55. There are few, if any, minority groups that are represented in the ranks of Latin
America's high courts.
56. For an excellent discussion on how politics influence the judiciary see
HAMMERGREN, POLITICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1; JOSE ANTONIO MARIN PALLIN, PERU: LA
INDEPENDENCIA DEL PODER JUDICIAL (Centro para la Independencia de Jueces y Abogados
ed., 1989); VICENTE ESTRELLA, CRISIS DEL PODER JUDICIAL EN LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
(1997).
57. In Colombia, after the violence between the Liberal and Conservative Party in the
1940s, the oligarchy decided to form a national front by which the political parties would al-
ternate in power every four years during a period of 16 years. Even after this National Front
ended, there existed a de facto party power sharing. See generally Nagle, supra note 33.
58. Political appointments interfere with judicial independence. Judges and lawyers
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean consider political appointments as a type of dis-
crimination that interferes with judicial independence and believe that judges should be se-
lected based on their talents and capacity, without regard for any type of discrimination. See
PALLIN, supra note 56; ADOLFO PEREZ ESQUIVEL & DAKNI DE ABREY DALLARI, LA
2000]
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judges appoint the Lower Court judges, Higher Court judges are usually re-
placed by the new governments. These new governments then impose their
predilection for certain appointees. 9 Higher Court candidates are generally
handpicked by the executive or by its allies.' As such, given the highly
volatile political climate, there is little likelihood that the judiciary would
stray far from executive authority. Presently, this symbiotic relationship per-
sists even in the present climate of judicial reform.
B. Problems with the Status Quo
The judiciary has been largely left to its own devices as long as the courts
towed the party line. Given the assumption that the higher courts were ex-
pected to rubber stamp executive authority and find constitutional justifica-
tion for executive actions, the courts commanded little respect from citizens
or from the other branches. This lack of judicial will to interfere with execu-
tive actions left Latin American countries at the mercy of capricious law-
making by executives working under their own executive declarations.61 In-
stead of transforming and reforming the state's institutions to embrace
disaffected groups, Latin America's elite have used the judicial branch to
"reward followers, ensure the outcomes of certain distributive decisions,
and otherwise enhance the political advantage of one partisan faction or an-
other."
What is worse, however, is that the judiciary has been a victim of its
own tendencies for self-preservation. The judiciary has long been "per-
ceived to be benefiting from the status quo and therefore unwilling to con-
sider reform... those who control the judiciary enjoy a monopoly on the
justice system, they have no incentive to promote reform or act effi-
ciently."'63 One could argue that this statement is not wholly accurate. While
the perception of a government institution trying to maintain the status quo
may be acceptable, the notion that a corrupt body would resist the potential
for personal enrichment via the funneling off of foreign aid for reform pro-
grams is absurd. Particularly if one is referring to the reform of the infra-
structure versus reforming how the judiciary fulfills the goals of a democ-
ratic government. Judicial officials would be all too happy to receive, for
instance, new computers and software applications, funds for contracts for
judicial support organizations, funds to build new facilities, or funds to pay
INDEPENDENCIA DE JUECES Y ABOGADOS EN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PARAGUAY Y URUGUAY
(1998).
59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60. See id. Confirmation is by simple majority in the Parliament with little or no debate
or investigation. See id.
61. This information is derived from the author's personal experience as a district judge
in Medellin, Columbia from 1983-1986.
62. HAMMERGREN, POLITICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 27.
63. Dakolias, supra note 28, at 170.
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2000], Art. 20
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol30/iss2/20
JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
for the hiring of staff for political and personal reasons. '
The factors that have exerted the strongest influence on fomenting
change in the judiciaries of Latin America are the increased economic pres-
sure on the position of Latin American nations in world markets, and the
need for first world nations to have stability in the region. The pressure di-
rected at the judiciaries has come from both internal and external forces. On
the internal side, reticent governments have been forced to respond to "[tihe
growing skepticism [of private sector representatives] over the judiciary's
ability to respond to conflict resolution challenges arising from increasingly
integrated and competitive markets, including sectors formerly dominated
by public monopolies, that demand specialized enforcement based on an
understanding of prevailing business practices."'"
External pressures, particularly foreign aid, exert pragmatic influence
on governments reliant on such assistance in order to preserve the status
quo, maintain hegemony, and stimulate development. Such pressures in-
clude: "initiatives of the United States government aimed at strengthening
the capacity of the regional judiciary, which have played a pioneering role
in the region," [and] the increasing role played by multilateral financial in-
stitutions in promoting judicial reform in conjunction with economic stabili-
zation .... and liberalization."'67
Such may have been the case when the Fujimori government in Peru in-
stigated a major judicial sector reform program in the mid-1990s by inviting
in a group of foreign consultants and negotiating a grant with Japan to fi-
nance a reform project.' President Fujimori recognized that foreign aid and
foreign investment to the government sector was linked to a judicial infra-
structure capable of attending to matters of commercial law and regulation.
When foreign institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank
and the United Nations Development Program showed a willingness to fund
a reform program, the Fujimori administration aggressively encouraged the
judiciary to begin a reform program with the goal of "improv[ing] judicial
performance and, especially, to reduce corruption and malfeasance as condi-
tions for attracting private foreign investment."' At this point, judicial re-
form became the target that both the executive branch and the judicial
branch worked together to bring about in order to stimulate economic de-
64. Many of these computers would end up in the personal libraries of the judges, the
contracts for judicial support and construction of new facilities would be given to companies
owned by the judges, or their family, or the elite. See id.
65. Garcia, supra note 36, at 1269 (citing Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Re-
form: The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 168 (1995)).
66. See id. at 1270 (citing Jorge Obando, Reforma del Sector Justicia, Gobernabilidad y
Desarrollo Democratico en America Latina y el Caribe (World Bank 1997); Shavid Javed
Burki & Guillermo Perry, The Long March: A Reform Agenda for Latin America and the
Caribbean in the Next Decade (World Bank 1997).
67. Id.
68. See HAMMERGREN, POLITICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 180.
69. ld. at 181.
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velopment and investment.
Likewise, in Mexico, President Ernesto Zedillo's presidential campaign
platform included judicial reform promises. In order to fulfill his campaign
promises upon entering office, he forced judicial reform measures through
the legislature in an extraordinarily short time. The judicial reform package
"included as many as twenty-seven constitutional amendments .... Con-
gress passed the reform in just ten days."70 The reforms were ratified and
published seventeen days later and immediately put into force.71
In the latter half of the century, the judiciary faced a mounting chal-
lenge in terms of its credibility, functional effectiveness, and standing vis-a-
vis the other powers of the State. Not to mention the judiciary's contribu-
tions as a bulwark for the protection of human rights in societies with vul-
nerable democratic institutions, its role in promoting a predictable institu-
tional environment in the economic sphere, and its obligation to provide a
forum for the fair and effective resolution of disputes.72
Latin American judiciaries have failed to fully perform their constitu-
tional duties. The reasons they have failed vary from country to country,
however, they can be summarized as threats and intimidation, corruption,
and the political pressure influencing judicial decisions." When Latin
American courts have attempted to tackle serious issues of law which affect
national policy in contradiction of the desire of the executive, or in many
cases in contradiction of the military oligarchy, the results have been disas-
trous. Such was the case in Columbia in 1985 during the presidency of Beli-
sario Betancur, when the military staged what essentially amounted to a
coup d'etat against that nation's Supreme Court. This notorious incident
was sparked by the poorly orchestrated takeover of the Palace of Justice by
the leftist guerrilla group, M-19. 4 The timing of this operation could not
have been more fortunate for the ultra-conservative factions in government
who despised both the Betancur administration and the Supreme Court for
its attempts to make peace with leftist guerrillas, and turn matters of sover-
eignty regarding the extradition of Colombian drug lords over to the United
States." Judiciaries have also maintained the status quo by abdicating their
authority to the executive branch or the military by failing to exercise con-
70. Alberto Szekely, Democracy, Judicial Reform, The Rule of Law, and Environmental
Justice in Mexico, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 385, 404 (1999).
71. See id.
72. See Garcia, supra note 36, at 1268.
73. See EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA & WILLIAM RATLIFF, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
2 (1995). In addition to the factors listed here, other factors to consider are judicial incompe-
tence due to the lack of talent attracted to the bench. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
74. M-19's ill-planned operation was intended to call national attention to the move-
ment's social and political platform after negotiations with the Betancur administration had
broken down. The palace was destroyed during the military's assault and nearly all the jus-
tices were killed. See ANA CARRIGAN, PALACE OF JUSTICE: A COLOMBIAN TRAGEDY (1993).
75. See id.
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trol over issues of constitutionality, or by deferring to the legislative body to
determine issues of state.76
II. PERSISTENT PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
"Under normal conditions, stability is an indicator of the strength and
well-being of democracy."" Normal conditions have not prevailed in most
Latin American nations, particularly with regards to the courts and its rela-
tionship to the people. The movement towards reform was initiated by reac-
tion to the- traumatic human rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s. During
this time, many Latin American countries became the battleground for Cold
War ideologies and violent clashes between conservative and leftist activ-
ists."8 The judiciaries were incapable of keeping pace with social and politi-
cal events. In addition, they were constrained by inefficiency, ineffective-
ness, and inconsequence, all influencing the groundswell of change
occurring throughout the region. As democratic principles triumphed over
totalitarian regimes, democratizing suddenly placed the judiciary at center
stage in Latin America. "The basic idea of the reform was to democratize
the judiciary by opening its structures to a new institutional framework."79
As a matter of judicial survival, judicial reform must be placed on the
horizon for representative government in Latin America. However, the chal-
lenge lies on where to start, what form judicial reform should take, and by
whom the reforms should be identified and implemented. Although Latin
American judiciaries all spring from the same genesis, the fundamental di-
lemma with discussing the vast problems with the judiciaries in Latin Amer-
ica is that they each operate under different political and constitutional con-
straints. However, regardless of the current structure and operation of each
court from nation to nation, they each share one common and vital trait: a
76. One example of this occurred in Peru, where the constitutional right to have a refer-
endum was annulled by order of the court, as such leaving the issue to Parliament. Specifi-
cally, the National Electoral body allowed Parliament to have the final decision on the admis-
sibility of a referendum to derogate Law 26657 (interprets article 122 of the Peruvian
Constitution), which allows the election of President Fujimori to a third term. See ANDEAN
COMMISSION OF JURISTS, AT A SLOW PACE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 22 (1999).
77. ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE ANDES: EMERGENT OR IN EMERGENCY?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (1997).
78. See id.
79. Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule
of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 S.W. I. L. & TRADE AM.
323, 324 (1998). Barra, writing on events in Chile, notes,
[t]he transition in Chile also echoed the regional movement towards change in le-
gal structures in all of Latin America. The movement "towards the rule of law,"
received important support from international agencies, which already produced
major statutory changes in a number of Latin-American countries, especially in
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nearly 200 year-old inferiority complex with the other branches of govern-
ment. This self-imposed subservience to the executive branch, and to the
legislative branch to a lesser degree, is responsible for the support of judi-
cial reform, mainly from international benefactors.
Many Latin American countries have jettisoned the traditional inquisi-
torial traditions of the continental system in favor of an Anglo-American
oral adversarial system for which no regional precedent, historical context,
or experience exists. From a legalistic point of view, this does not make
sense. Strengthening traditional institutions would better serve the region
than consigning judicial traditions to the trash heap. From an economic
viewpoint, which is the view promoted by leading judicial reformers, judi-
cial reform is the only way for Latin American countries to compete in the
global market, and ensure that foreign investments and trade will be pro-
tected when legal disputes arise. It is alarming to think that judicial reform
in Latin America is driven by money rather than by devotion to the rule of
law.
A. The Cinderella of Government
In a real democracy, the judiciary must be positioned with the executive
and legislative branches as one of the three pillars of government guarantee-
ing liberty, justice, and respect of the rule of law. However, "in most Latin
American and Caribbean countries, the judicial pillar is fractured, weak and
incapable of supporting the weight of its constitutional responsibilities.""0
The judiciary of modern democracy is plagued by a historical legacy of
meekness and subservience. Siez Garcia states:
The constitutions of all newly born Latin American republics established a
rigorous Montesquiean principle of separation of powers. Thus, the judi-
ciary was assigned a more restricted role than in colonial times. The dis-
tribution of power among branches of government was asymmetric, how-
ever, owing mainly to the personalized power relationships and a strong
administrative bureaucracy. The executive branch assumed a prevalence
vis-A-vis the legislative and judicial branches. During the following dec-
ades .... branches focused on the balance of power between the parlia-
ment and the executive, such as the debate over the prevalence of parlia-
mentary or presidential democracies. The judiciary played a lesser role in
defining the appropriate balance of power, reflecting the true power bal-
ance within the newly created states.
The courts of modem Latin American countries hardly deserve respect.
This in part because the courts have been the vehicle by which repressive
colonial regimes enforced monarchical and executive authority over the
populace. 2 In the process of the executive establishing authority over the
80. See IDB America, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
81. Garcia, supra note 36, at 1287 (citations omitted).
82. "Political instability and institutional crises over time have subjected regional judici-
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State, the meekness of the judicial branch negatively impacted the protec-
tion of individual and social rights. This in the face of state power and def-
erence to conservative constitutional authoritarianism. "Thus, the judiciary
in the region assumed a defensive role compared to major political actors
such as the military and political establishments."83
The infrastructure of the judiciary has languished to the degree that it
has failed to assert itself as an equal branch of government. Therefore, judi-
cial reform became an important component in aid packages from foreign
lending institutions and first-world nations attempting to prop up democratic
governments in developing nations. The judiciary is the least well regarded
and consequently the least well funded of the branches of Latin America
democratic government. The problems are endemic and universal through-
out the region: attrition is high, resources are meager, and continuing train-
ing are all but non-existent.
The incorporation of advanced technology into the courts occurs only in
the largest cities, leaving courts in small towns in the dark ages. Even today,
it is not unusual for secretaries of lower court judges to buy supplies from
their own salaries, to work on dilapidated manual typewriters, and to work
under candlelight during the all too frequent power outages. Carbon paper is
still in general use and there is little, if any, modern case management
apparatus available outside the courts of major cities. Then again, even in
the larger cities where technology has been made available to the courts,
there is an acute lack of interest on the part of judges to utilize new
technology, due in large measure to the lack of consistent, motivated, and
progressive judicial education." During an interview with a judge in
Colombia last summer, he pointed to the computer behind his desk and said
he had never used it because no one was available to train him on how to
use it.8" The computer had been on the judge's desk for months, but it had
never been turned on.
Being a judge is not considered a prestigious milestone in Latin Amer-
ica, therefore, the position of judge in the lower courts is not desirable to the
top legal talent. Consequently, lawyers get appointed to the bench who may
not have the legal training or mental capacity to do their jobs. Admitting
that the judiciary is incompetent, however, goes against the Latin mentality
of machismo and infallibility. 6 "In many countries, judicial ineptness is a
delicate topic."8 In fact, one could argue that such attitudes are part of the
aries to intense political influence, including their virtual subordination to the prevailing po-
litical forces." Id. at 1285 (citing T.D. FERGUS ET AL., EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 278-80
(1995)).
83. Id. at 1287.
84. See ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 76, at 47.
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
86. See generally Martha 1. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court: The Gender Jurispru-
dence of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 253 (1998).
87. Wendy Vicente, Comment, Questionable Victory for Coerced Argentine Pharmaceu-
tical Patent Legislation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 1101, 1138 (1998).
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root of the problems confronting judiciaries in the region.
Judgeships have often been the jobs no one seeks, unless the individual
is either truly committed to social justice, or interested in a venue for
acquiring wealth through bribery and corruption. Those who become lower
courts judges for the sake of societal good, however, are soon stymied by
their corrupt superiors who do not want reformers rocking the boat.
I Low self esteem in the court system is part of a larger morale problem.
In writing about the situation in Chile, de la Barra stresses the need to in-
crease prestige in the institution in order "to attract skillful people with high
ethical standards ... [and] to hire and maintain skillful people, not merely
depending on some idealistic lawyers.""
Associated to a high prestige profile goal is the institutional capacity to
develop an integral program of initial and continuing education... spe-
cific training will help create institutional identity and set a minimum
level of standard to exercise prosecutorial function .... This exercise will
also provide the elements to create the common language and practices
that will shape the new legal culture in criminal law and procedure and the
unwritten rule for acting inside the system. 8
9
Reform of the judiciary must begin with committed leadership in the
highest level of the judicial branch.
[T]he design of judicial policies must start with the clear leadership ofjudges as main characters of the reform strategy. It is equally incontro-
vertible that such a reform binds the other bodies of the state in the same
imperative manner, and demands that leadershigs coordinate actions, lay
bridges toward dialogue, and solidify consensus.
B. Judicial Corruption
Judicial malfeasance represents just one element of the corruption that
pervades most Latin American countries.9 In recent decades, much of the
corruption is attributable on a fundamental level, to the way things are done
in Latin America. Specifically, the oligarchy retains control through what-
ever means necessary, as long as wealth and power remain in the hands of
the elite. However, a large part of corruption in Latin American judiciaries
stems from the overwhelming influence of illegal drug production and traf-
ficking, particularly in nations whose territories are used as transshipment
staging areas, such as Panama,9 Chile, 93 Mexico,94 Paraguay,95 Brazil," and a
88. Cousino, supra note 79, at 337.
89. Id. at 338.
90. Fernando Carrillo Fl6rez, Supreme Courts of the Americas Organization: Judicial
Independence and Its Relationship with the Legislative Bodies, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1033,
1041 (1998).
91. For a probing analysis of judicial corruption see BUSCAGLIA, supra note 1, at95.
92. See Juanita Darling, Traffickers Set Up Shop in Panama Narcotics: Colombian Drug
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number of islands in the Caribbean.97
Drug lords have long penetrated and corrupted the judicial authorities
through coercion, threats, bribes, and blackmail. In the 1980s, Colombian
judges were offered the choice of "plata o plomo" (silver or lead)98 by drug
lords whose operations crossed international borders and invaded all levels
of society and government. It was not difficult to persuade judicial officers
to accept bribes because judges and court officials were so poorly paid and
were held in such low esteem in the legal profession. Not to mention that
the judicial system was wide open to corrupting influences given that the in-
stitution did not compensate, train, or monitor judges and judicial officers.
While many Latin American countries resolve to live with judicial cor-
ruption, attempts have been undertaken to break the status quo. In Vene-
zuela, current President Hugo Chavez has taken a highly aggressive stance
on reforming a "notorious judiciary"" by removing hundreds of judges dur-
ing the summer of 1999. This purge came at a time when the Venezuelan
Dealers Looking for Sanctuary From Their Violence-Racked Nation Are Returning, Authori-
ties Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at Al.
93. "The State Department, however, lists both Chile and neighboring Argentina as tran-
sit points for cocaine from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia." Geoffrey Mohan, Drug Smugglers'
New Route/Moving Cocaine via Chile, Pacific ports, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 2000.
94. "Mexico continues to be the primary transit country for cocaine entering the United
States from South America." General Accounting Office, Drug Control-U.S. -Mexican
Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges, GAO/NSIAD 98-154 (June 30, 1998).
95. According to Brazilian authorities, cocaine is shipped by small plane to Pedro Juan
Caballero, Paraguay, where it is then shipped overland into the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil. See
Edson Luis & Hugo Marques, CPI on Drugs Suggests Stricter Airport Controls, WORLD
NEWS CONNECTON, Sept. 22, 1999.
96. "Brazil has become big on the drug trafficking map for a number of understandable
reasons. The nation has lengthy borders with South American producers and smugglers of
cocaine, heroin and marijuana: Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay." Sebastian Rotella,
Drug Panel in Rarefied Territory: Investigators in Brazilian Probe Have Won the Support of
the Working Class, one Observer Points Out, Because 'People See the Rich and Powerful...
Going to Jail. Slowly, Things are Changing, 'L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 2000, at 1.
97.
According to interagency estimates, Mexico and Central America received 59 per-
cent of the cocaine during this period. The Caribbean countries accounted for 30
percent of the flow, and 11 percent was shipped directly to the United States from
source countries was shipped directly to the United States from source countries.
General Accounting Office, Drug Control-update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Carib-
bean and Eastern Pacific, GAO/NSIAD 98-30 (Oct. 15, 1997).
98. The phrase "silver or lead," represented the dilemma of Colombian judges to either
accept bribes or risk assassination by drug traffickers. Many of my colleagues on the bench
were assassinated for their refusal to give into the drug lords. I was finally forced to flee the
country as similar threats against me made my remaining in Colombia impossible. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text. During the so-called "War on Drugs" waged in Colombia
against the notorious Medellin Cartel in the late 1980s, more than 275 judges were murdered.
See id.
99. Bart Jones, Venezuela's Leader Launches Reform, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 1999,
available in 1999 WL 28124448.
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Constitution was being rewritten, including a mandate on reforming the way
judges would be appointed and trained.'" This shake-up was in reaction to
atrocious conditions in a court system in which "[t]hree-fourths of Vene-
zuela's inmates have never had their day in court, ' ' and "high-power law
firms write verdicts themselves and bribe judges to sign them."'" Addition-
ally a recent newspaper article stated:
The attempt to clean up the courts started ... after the nationally elected
assembly was installed to write a new constitution. Assembly members
said they had unearthed 4,000 formal complaints of wrongdoing against
many of the nation's 1,200 judges.
The allegations had been collecting dust for as long as 15 years in the of-
fices of the National Judges Council, which is supposed to investigate
such complaints, said Manuel Quijada, head of the assembly's judicial
emergency commission ....
In one recent case that provoked apublic outcry, judges dropped charges
against two dozen bankers accused in a 1994 scandal that nearly bank-
rupted the financial system and required a $10 billion government bailout.
Justice has long been subject to the whims of the country's increasingly
unpopular political parties, since Congress appoints judges from the Su-
preme Court on down. Just one-fourth receive permanent appointments,
meaning they can be dismissed for offending politicians, their allies or
powerful business interests.
"Judges make decisions based more on their fears than on judicial crite-
ria," said Juan Navarette of the Venezuelan branch of the human rights
group Amnesty International.' 3
While many observers consider President Chavez's actions extreme,' par-
100. Historically, judges were appointed by the Supreme Court, allowing for institution-
alized cronyism. The commission tasked with writing the constitution stressed that "U.S.-
style procedures for selecting, training and supervising judges" would be instituted and "Su-





In one notorious case, the Supreme Court bottled up corruption charges against
former President Jamie Lusinchi for years, ignoring the recommendation of the
investigating justice that Lusinchi be put on trial. The justice, Roman Duque
Corredor, resigned in protest in 1992. A group of Venezuela's most respected in-
tellectuals urged the rest of the court's members to do the same, but none did, and
the Lusinchi case died.
Id.
104.
Critics of the commission's actions said that the judges were being denied the
right to due process of law because they were not allowed to defend themselves
before they were suspended or dismissed. Adriana Lander of the Alliance for So-
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ticularly the elites who have been inconvenienced, his election to power was
by a popular mandate of people who were fed up by years of political cor-
ruption.
In of September 1999, the World Bank pledged to increase funding to
forty-eight countries to fight institutional corruption, targeting judiciaries in
need of judicial reform.'" Latin American countries targeted for funding
were Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and
Paraguay. However, it remains to be seen how much money funneled to
these countries will be siphoned off by the very corruption the aid is sup-
posed to fight. Corruption has and will remain a refined and discreet art
form in Latin America.
Among the more troubling problems with judicial reform appear in the
law enforcement agencies responsible for gathering evidence in the investi-
gative stage of the inquisitorial process because they are plagued by institu-
tional corruption. Judges and prosecutors often are unable to bring charges
against the police who are bribed to lose evidence, shield witnesses from
testifying, or target innocent and defenseless individuals in order to allow
guilty parties to go free.
It is not difficult for criminals to escape prosecution through bribery
and coercion because police are so poorly paid and educated, and come
from the lower rungs of Latin American society. During the Christmas sea-
son, policemen line up outside the gates of the estate of Joaquin Builes, a
drug lord in the Medellin Cartel, to receive Christmas cash "presents" for a
year of "service to the community."'" Colombian judges interviewed as re-
cently as June 1999 reported that they had solid evidence of judicial police
being involved in drug trafficking but they felt powerless to prosecute the
police because the corruption was so institutionalized that no charges would
ever stick.'" Even the mention of conducting an investigation would elicit
death threats against the judges.
Intimidation of judges by police and military investigators is frequent
and usually sufficient to quell any attempts to clean up the judicial system.
In one instance, a Colombian judge brought charges against two soldiers for
their involvement in a massacre of civilians. After issuing arrest warrants,
she was forced to leave the country due to death threats and in retaliation,
her father was murdered. 08
cial Justice, a non-governmental organization that supported judicial reform, said
that the commission's procedure 'may not be the most fair and orderly manner' for
ridding the country of corrupt judges.
Judges Purged in Courts Shake-up, Facts on File, WORLD NEWS DIG., Dec. 23, 1999, at C1.
105. See World Bank Joins 48 Countries in Corruption Fight, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Oct. 22, 1999.
106. Supra note 61 and accompanying text.
107. See id.
108. See Leslie Wirpsa, Economics Fuels Return of La Violencia: Colombia's Religious,
Human Rights Groups Seek End to Slaughter; Catholic Church Tries to Mediate Amid Tor-
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C. Lack of Capable and Honest Investigation
Incompetence within the judicial system is a serious obstacle that must
be overcome in order to raise the status of the judiciary as a respectable
branch of government. Many times, court procedures are often not followed,
and sometimes they are intentionally ignored. For example, procedures that
are required such as verifying the identity of a witnesses or securing physi-
cal evidence are often not followed. And when followed, they are done in
such an incompetent manner as to render the witness unavailable, or the
evidence contaminated, or damaged rendering it useless. Often times these
problem are due to the lack of training and care on the part of the police,
however, more often than not, the problems are intentional and the result of
bribery. For example, judges are required to conduct initial investigations of
crimes and turn evidence gathered at crime scenes to the police. However,
many times the evidence that is turned over to the police, particularly drugs
that the police are ordered to take to the forensics lab for testing, never
reach the lab.'" In addition, in many police coordinated raids on suspected
lure and Murder of Civilians by Paramilitary Forces and Others, NAT'L CATH. REP., Oct. 24,
1997, at 34. Wirpsa writes:
To understand the relationship among Colombia's paramilitary networks and their
development requires a return to the banana lands of Uraba. One of the first highly
publicized death squad massacres in Colombia was the March 1988 slayings of 22
workers from the Honduras and La Negra banana plantations in Uraba. Paramilita-
ries yanked the men from their beds and shot them. This collective killing was the
curtain raiser to a string of horrific massacres that year that claimed more than 600
lives. So frequent and brutal were the 1988 mass slayings that they prompted un-
precedented action from Colombia's judges. By September 1988, Judge Marta
Lucia Gonzalez announced preliminary results of her probe and brought charges
against two well-known drug traffickers, three military officials, a police lieuten-
ant, a local mayor and 11 other civilians. Gonzalez subsequently fled to the United
States because of death threats. Seven months later, her father, Alvaro Gonzalez,
was slain. In July 1989, the judge who assumed the investigation, Maria Elena
Diaz, was assassinated. As a result of her investigation, Gonzalez outlined an alli-
ance between the army, Medellin cartel drug traffickers, cattle ranchers and death
squads who trained in Puerto Boyaca.
Gonzalez claimed that Maj. Luis Felipe Becerra Bohorquez, from the intelligence
division of the Uraba army battalion, contracted with assassins to massacre the ba-
nana workers. A lieutenant and a captain were also linked to the massacre. De-
spite the ongoing investigation involving him, Becerra resumed normal military
life. He got a job running the army's press office and continued officer training
abroad. "When a government official tried to notify Becerra of a judicial decision
in 1989, he was told that the officer was not available since he was in the United
States taking a course necessary for his promotion to lieutenant colonel," Human
Rights Watch reported.
Id. For additional history see JENNY PEARCE, COLOMBIA: INSIDE THE LABYRINTH 232, 254,
257-58 (1990).
109. This circumstance occurred routinely while the author was a judge in Medellin,
Colombia. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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drug-processing labs, suspects are hardly ever arrested because they are
tipped off by police just prior to the raid taking place."'
The practice of cloning witnesses is one of the most repugnant practices
in Latin American courts. Cloning was the result of a system gone awry,
identities of witnesses had to be withheld by courts in order to protect
them, and to compel their testimony in notorious cases. "Cloning occurs
when the same person is presented on two or more separate occasions as dif-
ferent witnesses."''. Cloning has occurred in Peru and Colombia where
anonymous judges take testimony from anonymous witnesses.
Among the cases in which the United Nations Special Rapporteur noted
instances of witness cloning is the case Unirn Sindical Obrera (USO). This
case involved the petroleum workers' trade union in Colombia."' Twelve of
its members were arrested and accused of committing terrorist acts, and
brought before the regional courts."3 "Their capture and detention were
- based on testimony of at least four 'faceless' or anonymous informants who
collaborated with Army investigations. The Attorney-General (Procurador
General), while carrying out his oversight function in this case, determined
that some of these anonymous witnesses had been cloned."" 4
One can argue that no amount of judicial reform in Latin America
could alter the insidious behavior that is itself an institution. Especially as
long as the training and job requisites for police officers are a low priority, it
will remain difficult to recruit and retain individuals whose personal codes
of conduct are as strong as the letter of the laws they are supposed to honor
and uphold.
There are only few controls in place to deal with institutional corrup-
tion, and the situation is only aggravated by the power and influence of the
executive branch which exerts a shield of protection over investigative
agencies. Add to this the omnipotent presence of the military, which lurks
just beneath the surface of popular democracy. Both of these entities often
work in concert to prevent the judiciary from holding investigative units ac-
countable to high standards of conduct and efficiency.
Arbitrary decisions are also a constant problem at all levels of the judi-
ciary, and the legal system seems incapable of attacking them. Part of this
difficulty stems from the fact that laws are often confusing, hard to inter-
110. Seeid.
111. Question on Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Law-
yers, Mr. Param Cumaraswamy: Addendum: Report on the Mission of the Special Rappor-
teur to Colombai, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/199839/Add.2 (1998)
[hereinafter Question on Human Rights]. "This abuse of regional justice has been confirmed
in several cases where regular Army informants-some of whom are paid monthly wages to
testify - are used to accuse persons of rebellion or terrorist acts." Id.
112. See id.
113. See Luz E. Nagle, Colombia's Faceless Justice: A Necessary Evil, Blind Impartial-
ity or Modem Inquisition?, U. Pirr. L. REv. (forthcoming Summer 2000).
114. Question on Human Rights, supra note 111.
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pret, and unpredictable.' Despite expensive and tedious efforts, courts suf-
fer from great backlogs, delays, and needless errors in procedure."6
In addition to the inherent unfairness of a system in which those in con-
trol are also its prime beneficiaries, those willing to subject their claims to
such a system must contend with an equally daunting reality: the length of
time necessary to resolve a case once it reaches a Latin American court-
room. Cases commonly take up to twelve years to be resolved in court. Such
delays lead to two additional problems: 1) backlogs that limit access to the
judicial system, and 2) additional losses caused by the delay and prolonga-
tion of litigation for those fortunate enough to secure a place on the court
docket.'
Distrust of the judiciary continues to deepen, particularly among the
private sector, which worries over the "judiciary's ability to respond to con-
flict resolution challenges arising from increasingly integrated and competi-
tive markets, including sectors formerly dominated by public monopolies,
that demand specialized enforcement based on an understanding of prevail-
ing business practices.""' 8
The poor reputation of Latin American judges also stems from the pub-
lic's perception that many judges use their positions for personal gain and
consequently, apply the law arbitrarily. In Peru, for example, the popula-
tion's dissatisfaction with the judiciary has increased dramatically, which is
indicated by the number of disciplinary actions filed."9
Some Latin American countries are taking steps to identify and ac-
knowledge problems in their judicial system. One such example is Para-
guay's Supreme Court which seems to be moving in the right direction by
having identified the following "obstacles for the objective regarding effi-
cient and real justice":
(1) Tardiness in trials;(2) Deficient quality in the procedure of trials and sentences;(3) Inadequate, insufficient, or untimely resources;
(4) Expensive justice;(5) Inadequate internal information;
(6) Efficient public relations;(7) Insufficient confirmation as a State power;
(8) Inefficient justice related organs; and
(9) Inadequate and insufficient decentralization. 2
115. See BUSCAGLIA & RATCLIFF, supra note 73, at 2.
116. For an extensive analysis of the problem see Edgardo Buscaglia, A Quantitative
Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin America, 17 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 275 (1997).
117. See Dakolias, supra note 28, at 170.
118. Garcia, supra note 36, at 1269 (citing Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Re-form: The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 168 (1995)).
119. See ANGEL PAEZ, THE DREADFUL COURT, LA REPUBLICA 8 (1994). In 1993, 9121
complaints were filed compared with 3319 in 1991. See id.
120. Enrique A. Sosa Elizeche, Restructuring of Justice Administration in Paraguay, 42
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1157 (1998).
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D. Violence Against the Judiciary
The lack of faith and trust in the judiciary raises the prospect of vio-
lence occurring against the judiciary in part because of the perception that
the courts are so inefficient, and so corrupt as to be incapable of dispensing
fair and equitable justice.
Only the naive would seriously argue that the government renders equal
attention to all citizens. The lower class does not impact the government in
the same manner as the middle and upper class do. Therefore, it is unfair to
expect disaffected citizens to be anything but alienated and distrustful.'
This distrust led to the rise of paramilitary and vigilante groups (auto-
defensas) that exact justice with their own swift and brutal methods.' Vigi-
lante groups exist because citizens believe that their institutions of govern-
ment are incapable of protecting them, their interests, or their property.
Therefore, citizens were forced to seek justice through extra-judicial means,
outside of government intervention. Vigilante justice is the only viable al-
ternative for those who are already marginalized from the institutional jus-
tice system because they know that the alternative is to wait for many years
for justice to be served.'
The same vigilante and paramilitary groups that take the law into their
own hands have been responsible for acts of violence and intimidation
against judges, prosecutors, and judicial police units. In countries with no
formal government control, such as Peru, Colombia, and southern Mexico,
paramilitaries have been responsible for human rights violations, and the
carrying on of criminal enterprises. Attempts by the judiciary to bring pa-
ramilitary groups to justice have resulted in the assassination of judges and
prosecutors. Such was the case on January 18, 1989 in Colombia when two
judges of the public order courts"" and ten assistants investigating accusa-
tions of paramilitary atrocities were brutally murdered.'25
121. See generally Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democ-
racy in the United States: Evaluating The OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 393 (1994).
122. For a practical examination of the autodensas and paramilitary groups in Latin
America see CARLOS MEDINA GALLEGO, AUTODEFENSAS, PARAMILITARES Y NARCOTRAFICO
EN COLOMBIA: EL CASO PUERTO BOYACA (1990).
123. In Brazil, for example, of the more than 4 million cases filed in the courts of first
instance in 1990, less than 58% were adjudicated by the end of that year. See Dakolias, supra
note 28, at 171 (citing Maria Tereza Sadek & Rogerio Bastos Arantes, The Crisis of the Bra-
zilian Judiciary: The Judges Perspective, Paper Presented at the 16th World Congress Con-
ference of the International Political Science Association (Aug. 21-25, 1994)) (on file with
the author)). In several courts of first instance in Bolivia, only 42% of the cases that enter the
system are disposed of in the same year. Bolivia: Judicial Reform Project. It is not surprising
that vigilantism is am attractive and popular alternative. See id.
124. See generally Nagle, supra note 113.
125. Three of the 15 men survived by faking death. According to Carlos Eduardo
Lozano, the National Director for Criminal Instruction, "lower and middle-rank chiefs of the
police and the Army are tolerating and sponsoring ultrarightist groups." AMERICAS WATCH,
THE KILLINGS IN COLOMBIA 98 (1989).
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The executive branch has a poor record of ensuring the safety and secu-
rity of judicial officers. This was most apparent during the 1980s and 1990s
in Columbia during the "War on Drugs" when hundreds of judges and court
officials were murdered in narco-terrorist attacks.'2 6 This bleak situation
gave little incentive for lawyers to become judges during a time when a
judge's life expectancy was about two years.
III. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND INDEPENDENCE
Many have addressed the need for promoting judicial independence as a
component of judicial reform.'2 Dakolias stresses that "the quality and in-
tegrity of a judicial system can be measured best by the quality and integrity
of its judges."'28 The notion of judicial independence is threefold: 1) de-
tachment from political affiliations and special interests; 2) individual
autonomy from the judicial bureaucracy; and 3) independence from the
other branches.of government. 29 In addition, add to this reverence for a code
of judicial conduct enforced by a disciplinary body of judicial officers and
non-judicial participants. The first element of judicial independence, de-
tachment from party affiliations, is held hostage by the power exerted on the
judiciary by the other branches of government, a situation that is as "dis-
abling as any other judicial or psychological attack on the judiciary. '
Judges in the lower courts have struggled for years with internal
commotion within the judiciary that impedes their ability to render
independent decisions, and take proactive actions in navigating the justice
landscape. Fiss notes that "[i]n common law systems, judges feel the
126. See Jeffrey Stalk, Faceless Judges Dodge Assassins, TnMEs, Dec. 17, 1991, at Al.
Stalk reported:
Nowhere in the world do judges and lawyers work at such risk as in Colombia, a
recent report by the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists says. Be-
tween July 1989 and June 1990, 37 judges and lawyers were killed there. Another
36 court officials were murdered the following year while others were forced by
persistent death threats to quit their jobs and flee the country. In all, 350 judicial
officials have been killed in Colombia since 1980 and one-fifth of the country's
more than 4,300 judges have been threatened with death.
Id. In late 1985 following the Palace of Justice tragedy and the assassination of some of my
close colleagues, I called the Ministry of Justice to request protection. The Ministry's re-
sponse was that I should wear running shoes to the office because the Ministry had no way to
protect me. I was fortunate that a friend, an army general, who took it upon himself to pro-
vide me with an around-the-clock military escort. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
127. For a detailed analysis of judicial independence see Christopher M. Larkins, Judi-
cial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J.
ComP. L. 605 (1996).
128. Dakolias, supra note 28, at 172.
129. See id.; OWEN M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55, 55-56 (Irwin P. Stotsky ed.,
1993).
130. Robert G. Vaughn, Proposals for Judicial Reform in Chile, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
577, 603 (1993).
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Fiss notes that "[i]n common law systems, judges feel the pressure of other
judges through the doctrine of stare decisis,' '. 3' which is foreign to Latin
American judiciaries. Stare decisis cannot easily be adapted by the conti-
nental law terrain. This is mainly because there is no historical precedent
upon which such doctrine could be founded. Judicial independence assumes
that judges are free from the influence of the other branches in judicial pro-
ceedings. However, in most Latin American countries, executive power and
party affiliations exert enormous bureaucratic and back-room pressure on
the courts. While a judge may believe she can render fair and impartial deci-
sions in the face of such pressure, there is no control over the actions of
subordinates or other judicial officers who may, and do, sabotage judicial
proceedings. The patron-client legacy inherited from Ancient Rome makes
achieving "political insularity," ' eliminating the influence of other
branches of government and other political entities, nearly impossible in
Latin America.'33 This still persists in Latin America' and influences how
alliances are made, appointments are assigned, and careers sustained. "' As
long as emphasis in the legal profession and in politics is based on who one
knows rather than what one knows, it will be nearly impossible to establish
a judiciary with enough autonomy to make independent decisions.
Dakolias argues that "[plersonal independence for judges can be
achieved through appropriate methods of appointment, removal, and super-
vision." 3' However, even in the United States where appropriate methods
for appointment, retention, removal, and supervision are entrenched, there is
no guarantee that judges will exercise independent authority and decision-
making. This was the case in the recent fiasco in Miami where a Cuban-
American state court judge prevented a child from being repatriated to his
father in Cuba, this in direct contradiction to the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, and accepted norms of international law.'37
131. Owen M. Fiss, The Limits of Judicial Independence, 25 U. MIAMI. INTER-AM. L.
REV. 57, 58 (1993).
132. Id. at 59.
133. The patron-client legacy is an ancient social-economic system in which individuals
attached themselves to influential and political elites in order to improve their position in the
society in exchange for unquestioned support for the patron's affairs. See generally ERNEST
GELLNER & JOHN WATERBURY, PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETIES (1977).
134. Throughout Latin America since the earliest days of colonization, local strongmen
(known as caudillos or patrones) have held control over regional commerce, politics, and so-
cietal affairs. The fate of those living within the sphere of influence of strongmen was de-
pendent upon absolute allegiance to the strongman. Likewise, the caudillos depended upon
their clients in order to maintain power and influence. See generally Friedberg, supra note
31.
135. "The rule of law is not secure when the body for its enforcement is composed of
judges who either fear challenging the government or are already predisposed toward declar-
ing its deeds legal." Larkins, supra note 127, at 608.
136. Dakolias, supra note 28, at 175.
137. See Mary Hladky, Ruling on Elian Adds Fuel to Debate on Whether State Should
Stop Electing Trial Judges, BROWARD DAILy Bus. REv., Jan. 21, 2000, at B I; Manny Garcia,
Possible Conflict of Interest Questions for Judge in Case of Cuban Boy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
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In Latin America, corruption is so intensely woven in the fabric of gov-
ernment that accountability to the people is of almost no consequence. Re-
moval of judges occurs as a result of backlash from the executive branch, at
times when the court moves to curb the activities of the executive branch.
As well as, when a new regime comes into power and decides to clean
house and replace judges with those who subscribe to the new order. Fur-
thermore, there is little historical precedent for judicial activism and inde-
pendence. These are concepts foreign to the legal traditions of the civil law
system, and particularly to the civil law systems of Latin America. Rather,
the symbiotic relationship between the courts and the executive branch re-
mains complex and entrenched by constitutional precedent and tradition.3
The judiciary has traditionally conducted its work largely free from
public scrutiny because the laws enforced are not based on stare decisis.
There is a disconnection between the judicial decision-making process and
how the decisions are deemed acceptable to the society. This is the case be-
cause in the eyes of the people, the courts have been so closely associated
with the executive branch, that there is simply no trust in the judicial
branch.
The purpose of the judiciary in any society is to order social relation-
ships among private and public entities and individuals, as well as to resolve
conflicts among these societal actors. Unfortunately, the Latin America ju-
dicial system is widely perceived to be in a state of crisis because it cannot
fulfill these basic expectations. A climate of distrust and frustration perme-
ates the judicial system and has been acknowledged by virtually every sec-
tor of society including private individuals, the business community, and ju-
dicial system insiders like judges and lawyers. This perception of
ineffectiveness by the institution's potential users discourages intended
beneficiaries from seeking services, and leaves them with low expectations
of justice when forced to participate in judicial proceedings.'39 This lack of
trust in the autonomy of the courts is in part responsible for the rise the
autodefensas and paramilitary groups who feel compelled to take matters of
justice into their own hands.
A problem also exists in determining how the judiciary attempts to en-
force the law which the public perceives as interference with the natural or-
der of society. For instance, should the judiciary punish a peasant father liv-
ing in a remote region of a country who commits incest with his daughters
12, 2000.
138. For an excellent discussion on Latin American judiciaries see Fiss, supra note 131,
at 67-76.
139. See Dakolias, supra note 28, at 173. Dakolias notes that in Argentina only 13% of
the public has confidence in the administration of justice and only 16% of the public polled
has confidence in that country's judges. In Brazil, 63% of the public views the administration
of justice as "average" or "poor or substandard." id. "The worst case perhaps exists in Peru,
where 96% of the population lacks confidence in judges, and 86% has either little or no con-
fidence in the overall administration of justice" according to a World Bank assessment on the
judicial sector in Peru. Id.
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when he probably has had little exposure to the law of the nation, and has
lived his life according to local, age-old customs which permits this prac-
tice. Should the judiciary enforce laws for which rural groups such as in-
digenous cultures have no association or understanding. The basic tenets of
a modem democracy assume that the population understands democratic
principles and live under one rule of law. Therefore, it is possible for the ju-
diciary to function in a country where more than one rule of law exists. The
government has not given the judiciary the tools to educate the public about
the laws and how they must be applied in order to ensure a civil society.
Given such a situation, the judiciary is particularly distrusted by isolated ru-
ral and indigenous societies.
There is significant resistance by the other branches of government to-
ward modernizing the courts, or granting stronger authority to the judicial
branch. Judicial activism is viewed with considerable distrust and skepti-
cism. If the traditional role of the judiciary was to condone the exercise of
executive power, then there is little interest in new authority or autonomy to
the judiciary that might liberate the courts from executive tutelage, and in
the process, expose the executive to scrutiny or loss of power. Simply put,
the other two branches do not want Cinderella to come to the ball. Changes
in the laws affecting the judiciary worsen the stability and credibility of this
branch. In Peru, for instance, Congress passed a law"w which "has all but
nullified the constitutional attributions of the national council of the judici-
ary-''4 Furthermore, in 1997 the Peruvian Congress dismissed three magis-
trates of the constitutional court. This action prevented the court from hear-
ing and deciding on the constitutionality of recently passed laws.' 2 In
Ecuador, the legislature has repeatedly rejected proposals to have the consti-
tutional court as the ultimate interpreter of the laws.'4 3 In Bolivia, in late
July of 1998, the President called an extraordinary session of Congress to
elect the titular and alternate members of the constitutional court. This proc-
ess was highly questionable, but proceeded nevertheless.'"
Attempts by the judiciary to take an activist or independent role have
been ugly and embarrassing. In Colombia in 1991, a new constitution cre-
ated a constitutional court to interpret the constitutionality of a wide range
of political and social issues. In 1994, the court legalized personal posses-
sion and use of illegal drugs. This decision was based on dubious legal rea-
soning,' and elicited domestic and international outcry. In response, the ex-
ecutive branch labeled the court a loose cannon of State, and the ill-
conceived decision appeared to confirm to the world the widely held belief
that Colombia was nothing more than a narco-democracy.
140. See PERU Law No. 26933 (amended by Law No. 26973).
141. ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 76, at 24.
142. See id. at 42.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 41.
145. See Nagle, supra note 33, at 85-88.
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When the judiciary has been bold enough to go after government cor-
ruption, the other two branches have been quick to condemn the court, and
challenge its sanity. For example, a case in point are the judicial proceed-
ings in Colombia in 1997, referred by the press as "Case 8000." These pro-
ceedings consisted of faceless courts" that launched an in-depth investiga-
tion into political corruption caused by the infiltration of narco-trafficking. 47
Many politicians and officials connected to the Presidential administration
of Ernesto Samper, including the President himself, were accused of illicit
enrichment from the Cali Cartel.48 Many of the accused were tried, con-
victed, and sentenced, including a former Attorney General who was fined
and sentenced to eight years in prison for illicit enrichment in connection
with bribes received from drug lords.'49
Prior to this investigation, the faceless courts were praised by the other
two branches of government as the last hope for Colombia to fight drug traf-
ficking, guerrilla insurgency, sedition, and human rights abuses. As part of
that support, four consecutive presidential administrations solicited millions
of dollars in foreign aid from the United States to develop, train, and fund
the court. However, when the faceless courts turned its prosecutorial atten-
tion on government corruption, the politicians cried foul and accused the
courts of incompetence and vigilantism. In fact, President Samper's associ-
ates in Congress introduced a bill that would have abolished the crime of il-
legal enrichment.5 ' Then, in late 1998, a bill was introduced, but did not
pass, that would have eliminated the faceless courts altogether. The Justice
Minister's efforts to prevent the bill from passing resulted in his resignation,
and his successor vowed to "work to end the faceless judges for crimes that
were not typified as 'atrocities."""' The irony of this incidence is that the
executive branch lobbied the United States intensely for judicial reform aid
to establish the faceless courts, and then turned on the courts when the
courts showed signs of judicial independence.
When a preceding presidential administration leaves office and leaves
behind a judiciary packed with allies, the judiciary may be impeded from
exercising judicial independence. The judiciary that remains, is largely un-
der the influence of prior authoritarians making it difficult for succeeding
executives to institute new political mandates. Such was the case in Chile
146. Since July of 1999, the "Regional Courts" are now called the "Courts of Special-
ized Criminal Circuits."
147. See Prosecutors Under Political Pressure, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Feb. 10, 1998,
at 64.
148. See Former Attorney General Received Prison Term For Illicit Enrichment, BBC
SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 29, 1997.
149. See id.
150. See Douglas Farah, U.S. -Colombia Ties Strained Over Drugs: Americans See Per-
vasive Cartel Influence, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1996, at A21.
151. Id. This attempt to change the jurisdiction of the court was a veiled attempt to
shield leaders of the Cali Cartel from prosecution by the faceless courts since they were never
charged with committing violence. See id.
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where President Patricio Aylwin replaced General Pinochet, but was forced
to deal with a Supreme Court of Pinochet appointees.' 2
As long as the judiciary selection process remains the same, one in
which higher court judges are appointed by the President from a list com-
piled by the Supreme Court (under the auspices of the legislature), and
lower court judges are appointed by the Supreme Court, the judiciary will
remain a branch of government manipulated by external factors and not in
full control.' 3
IV. THE CONSULTING GAME
Judicial reform projects are generally oriented in two areas of the re-
form for the justice system: procedural and administrative. Projects target-
ing procedural reforms range from the training and education of judicial of-
ficials, to completely altering the Latin American judicial system from an
inquisitorial tradition to an oral adversarial model. 5" On the other hand,
administrative reforms target issues such as case management, personnel
training and staffing, records storage and retention, judicial education pro-
grams, and the application of technology in the courts. Specialists in judicial
reform have identified specific areas where reform is necessary. These in-
clude "judicial independence, judicial administration, procedural codes, ac-
cess to justice, legal education and training, and bar associations.., and
personnel administration."'55 Given the broad range of issues imbued in each
of these areas of concern, court consultants have had no difficulty putting
together proposals to feed the consulting machine.
Regardless of the emphasis of reform projects, international sponsors
and consultants on judicial reform emphasize economic and global trade
considerations as ample reason to push for judicial reform in the region. An
autonomous and dependable judicial system is not only needed for devel-
opment on a microeconomic level, it is also a requirement for participation
in an increasingly complex and competitive marketplace."6
152. See Fiss, supra note 131, at 71-74.
153. One clear exception is in Uruguay where Supreme Court justices are elected by a
two thirds majority of the total members of the National Congress in a meeting of both
Chambers, the Congress, and Senate. See Milton Cairoli Martinez, Relationship Between the
Judicial Power and the Bar Associations, 42 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1127, 1128 (1998).
154. See the extensive discussion on changing from an inquisitorial system in Cousino,
supra note 79, at 328-36.
155. Dakolias, supra note 28, at 168.
156. See id. at 169. Dakolias writes:
Latin American countries currently participate as members of the World Trade
Organization and regional trade associations like MERCOSUR, "the Common
Market of the South." Many also aspire to accede to the North [American] Free
Trade Agreement. Membership, however, brings with it a responsibility to pursue
harmonization of laws. This requires revisions of existing laws and speedy and
just resolution of disputes. To preserve confidence in trading relationships, mem-
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Large-scale improvement projects could not be accomplished without
foreign aid. This opened the door of opportunity to organizations such as the
American Bar Association, the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID), the World Bank, the United Nations Development
Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the National Center for
State Courts. The interest of these organizations in providing reform assis-
tance has not been based solely on altruism. These organizations, as players
in the consulting game, saw a potential windfall for generating lucrative
contracts for their army of consultants and staffers in the area of judicial
administration, education, and planning.
There is a very unsavory element connected to judicial reform and jus-
tice reform programs, at least those sponsored by the executive branch of
the United States. A link has been established between the aid agencies, and
intelligence gathering agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). As a matter of fact, the former director of the International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the United States
Department of Justice, has accused the CIA of infiltrating the reform pro-
grams and recruiting staffers to spy on government.' According to four
former ICITAP staffers, and one State Department official, the CIA has
from time to time sought to recruit staffers, contractors, and trainees affili-
ated with the reform program in countries such as Haiti and El Salvador,
where ICITAP has trained thousands of police officers.
One former ICITAP contractor in Haiti indicated that he and other in-
structors were informed by students "that they were solicited by U.S. intel-
ligence services." Charles Allen, a legal adviser to the Richardson, Texas
police department who worked for ICITAP in 1995, believes the practice of
intelligence agents approaching "was wrong."'5 " Allen stated that when he
went "to Haiti, [he] went with the understanding that the country had never
had a democratic government or civilian police force."'' 9 Allen also believes
that intelligence recruiting was "not good for those cadets, not good for
Haiti, and not good for the program. [Their only purpose was to] make civil-
ian police out of them, not spies."'"
The fact that the CIA has infiltrated judicial reform programs in order
to "spy" on the governments in which reform programs take place is not
troubling per se. After all, given the level of institutionalized corruption in
many Latin American governments, all bets are off when dealing with un-
trustworthy governments. The problem that exists is that such infiltration by
ber countries must have assurance that laws will be applied and interpreted in ac-
cordance with international or regional standards.
Id.
157. See Sam Skolnik, Ex-DOJ Official Claims Bid to Keep CIA Out of Police Training
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one government agency into the affairs of another government is indicative
of inherent flaws and lack of control within the organizations conducting the
reform projects. As such, this does not cast judicial reform in a favorable
light, leaving one to wonder whether taxpayer money is being well spent.
The foreign judicial reform aid package sponsored by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) to retool and reform the
Colombian judiciary, is another example of a judicial reform project that is
being used as a tool to advance the foreign policy of the United States. 6' In
1986, Colombia joined a reform project under the auspices of the Admini-
stration of Justice (AOJ) program of USAID 6 Initially, the aid was in-
tended to improve case management and disposition in the Colombian
courts, which had reported unprecedented case backlogs. However, a num-
ber of external factors were at work behind USAID's interest in assisting
Colombia. The Bush Administration's Andean Initiative to fight the drug
war, was not succeeding as planned, and the violence between the drug
lords, leftist guerrillas, and right wing extremists was pushing the Colom-
bian judiciary to the edge of collapse. After Colombia cancelled its extradi-
tion treaty with the United States during the Gaviria Administration, the
USAID AOJ program presented an opportunity for the Bush Administration
to obtain results in prosecuting the drug war through direct involvement in
the Colombian judicial system. The AOJ effort in Colombia was planned to
include training and support for prosecuting serious crimes, including all
crimes related to narcotrafficking and narcoterrorism. This effort came to be
known as the Rule of Law program.63 In the program, funds sent to the
public order courts (the faceless courts), were then supposed to spearhead
efforts to bring the drug lords to justice. By the mid 1990s, Colombia re-
ceived more than $36,000,000 in foreign aid under the Rule of Law pro-gram. '"
The timing of the Rule of Law program could not have been better for
the United States. In 1991, the U.S. needed Columbia's support in the UN
for the use of force in the Persian Gulf War. The Bush Administration also
needed to show a victory of some sort in the war of drugs, therefore, some
critics of the aid package" suggest that ulterior motives were behind the
large amount of money pledged to Colombia. Therefore, it is not beyond the
realm of possibilities that a quid pro quo deal was struck between Washing-
ton, D.C. and Bogoti
161. Id.
162. See 22 U.S.C. 2346(c). The enabling legislation was 22 U.S.C. § 534 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. See Pub. L. No. 87-195; International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985 (Pub. L. No. 99-83).
163. See Colombia Justice Sector Reform Project, Detailed Project Paper, USAID,
AID/LAC/P-669.
164. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
165. See Attorney Mark Sherman, Adress at Symposium of the Lawyers Committee in
Madison, Wis. (1995). Mr. Sherman is a Washington attorney and expert on United
States/Columbia drug policy. See id.
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Strengthening the capabilities of the public order courts took on a new
significance by allowing the United States to remain engaged in bringing
the Columbian drug cartels to justice, while President Gaviria's hands were
tied over the extradition debacle. In addition, Noam Chomsky states that
pressure from American corporations to secure investments threatened by
guerrilla insurgency, and leftist labor leaders, played a role in expanding the
jurisdiction of the public order courts to include the prosecution of individu-
als involved in almost any type of anti-government activity.'
The judicial reform program went forward and the public order courts
drew sharp international criticism for fomenting human rights violations.
Likewise, USAID was criticized by NGO for having broken its own re-
quirements "that basic standards of human rights be in place."'67 After
having reviewed a number of USAID reports, it remains unclear to what
extent USAID was monitoring the activities of the public order courts. To
this day, USAID insists that the judicial reform project was a tremendous
success, and that the money was well spent, this despite the fact that highly
credible NGO, such as Amnesty International and the Andean Commission
of Jurists, compiled considerable evidence on human rights abuses and
political violence tied to the public order courts. 68
The experience of judicial reform in El Salvador raises a troubling issue
regarding foreign consultants placing the cart before the horse. In the years
following the drafting of a new constitution in 1983, "a small group of con-
cerned jurists, only a few of whom were actively engaged in politics,"'"
came together to institute changes to the judicial sector. The key emphasis
was on "eliminating human rights abuses and impunity, especially as it re-
lated to abuses of power by the military and paramilitary groups."'70 During
the ensuing decade, outside actors such as the United States and the United
Nations, became involved in judicial reform efforts, but "[n]one of these ex-
ternal institutions had any experience in promoting this kind of reform.' 7 '
Hammergren states:
They were, thus, amenable to adopting proposals of the local reform ad-
166. See Nagle, supra note 113. These claims were asserted during the meeting of the
Lawyers Committee in Madison, Wisconsin in 1995. See supra 165 and accompanying text.
167. Harry Blair & Gary Hansen, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Ap-
proaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs (USAID Program and Operations,
1994).
168. See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COLOMBIA: PUBLIC
ORDER, PRIVATE INJUSTICE (1994); ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, COLOMBIA PUEDE SALIR
DE SU CRISIS CON LA AYUDA DE LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL (1995); ANDEAN
COMMISSION OF JURISTS, COLOMBIA: EL DERECHO A JUSTICIA (1988); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: MYTH AND REALITY (1994); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA'S KILLER NETWORKS: THE MILITARY-PARAMILITARY PARTNERSHIP
AND THE UNITED STATES (1996).
169. HAMMERGREN, POLITICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 215.
170. Id. at 16.
171. Id.
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vocates. However, their involvement, increasing reliance on foreign ex-
erts, and focus on government institutions represented a pyrrhic victory
r local reformers. This group was gradually sidelined from the more de-
tailed development of programs, where the expertise was provided by out-
siders and the negotiation of terms occupied the foreign donors and gov-
ernment actors. This development did not dilute the reform goals, which
retained much of their initial focus on human rights, due process and de-
politicization. It did, however, eliminate the only individuals with suffi-
cient knowledge of the target institutions to detect emerging problems as
reform proposals, including many of their own, clashed with local reality.
Those who did not withdraw entirely retained less than effective participa-
tion. They became junior partners in the reform design teams, or external
critics, concerned less with the mundane details of implementation than
with the programs' doctrinal purity."'
Judicial reform programs are of a finite character because they are de-
pendent on funding allocations. The window of opportunity is created dur-
ing which funds will be available to accomplish the proposed goals of the
program. Once the program funding is exhausted, the program ends, regard-
less of whether the goals of the program have been met. The nature of judi-
cial reform, however, cannot be limited to beginning and ending dates. Re-
form projects require a significant commitment of time and resources over a
period of years. If there is no opportunity for fine tuning newly installed
programs or for follow-up monitoring, there is a risk that the programs will
be abandoned or cause additional problems down the road. This leads to the
concern that reform programs require careful due diligence and risk analysis
prior to the programs being undertaken, and before significant funds are
committed. Otherwise, rather than performing good deeds to bolster Latin
America's justice systems, judicial reform programs may only serve to
threaten the relationship between the United States and its southern
neighbors.
CONCLUSION
"An ideal judiciary applies and interprets the laws equitably and effi-
ciently. Such a judiciary requires predictability in the outcomes of cases, ac-
cessibility to the courts by the population regardless of income level, rea-
sonable times to disposition and adequate court-provided remedies."'' 3
There is a need for reforming the judiciaries of many Latin American na-
tions. But, real reform must take place within the other two branches of
government which today continue to use the judiciary as a tool for advanc-
ing the interests of the ruling elite. The other branches must relinquish the
historical chains placed on the judiciary as a subservient branch of govern-
ment. But, as Sherwood notes, "judicial reform is essentially a matter of po-
172. Id.
173. Dakolias, supra note 28, at 169-70.
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litical will.'
74
The massive amounts of aid forwarded to the judiciaries of Latin Amer-
ica should be looked at unfavorably because the motivation behind the aid is
not always valid. Judicial reform projects benefit the armies of highly com-
pensated consultants and NGOs whose existence depends to large measure
on judicial reform projects more than the programs benefit the targeted in-
stitutions. There is also something very disingenuous about judicial reform
projects run by United States citizens who have little if any legal training,
familiarity with the continental law system, language facility, and cultural
orientation to the countries in which they go to work. This, in addition to lit-
tle, if any, accountability for the quality of work being done, and no way of
knowing if project staffers are being hood-winked by unscrupulous or cor-
rupt Latin American judicial officers. In the scramble to win grants for con-
ducting such projects, there is the possibility that due diligence and risk
analysis for the organizations just does not get done. The danger then arises
that the organization may find itself mired in a project it will come to regret,
particularly if it turns out that the judiciary it is working for has been cheat-
ing under the table, or is so vilified by the world community (not to mention
the target country) that the judicial reform organization loses credibility.
Judicial reform projects are suspect when they are accompanied by an
attitude that only models from the United States can fix what is wrong in
Latin America. Instead of reforming, many Latin American countries they
are transforming legal systems into a common law-United States style judi-
cial system. This is a faulty strategy and takes the judiciaries down a slip-
pery slope.' Such transformations are too often based upon the unrealistic
vision of how justice works in the United States. Some have argued that in
order to improve the judiciary in Latin America, judges should be elected,
and that the reforms should be more consumer oriented.'" 6 But how can we
talk about reforms through elections when the elections are nearly always
corrupt, and so few citizens vote. Many Latin American citizens do not
know they have a right to vote, do not know what voting means, and do not
understand the implications of their votes. Practically speaking, a vote goes
to whoever sponsors the truck loads of food and alcohol at election time.
It is true that judicial reform efforts in Latin America are not without
success stories. Costa Rica has undergone successful changes, at least as the
reforms pertain to the appointment and training of judges. However, one
must consider the fact that Costa Rica is unique in Latin America in that
there is no standing army lurking in the shadows in support of a powerful
autocratic executive branch. The dynamics of power are considerably dif-
174. Robert Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries,
37 IDEA 491, 501 (1997).
175. This strategy was disastrous in Argentina. See Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and
Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and Its Collapse in Argentina, 21
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77 (1997).
176. See Sherwood, supra note 174, at 501.
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ferent than in other nations in the region, and attempts to apply what worked
in Costa Rica to other Latin American countries may not work.
Latin American judiciaries must be reformed in some manner, but the
process should be one of strengthening and reinforcing, rather than one of
total transformation undertaken in a social, historical, and cultural vacuum.
At the same time, the political branches must stop intervening in the affairs
of the judiciary, particularly where changes to the judiciary are brought
about by executive and legislative branches without the advice and consent
of the judiciary branch.
For reforms to be successful and meaningful, they must be inclusive,
comprising institutional, social, economic, and political factors-without
forgetting the traditions upon which the systems were founded. Reform
must not be solely focused on the judiciary, but on the individual institu-
tions and a country's citizens. There is hope for a cure only if the ill patient
is treated as a whole. If only one small part of the body is treated, the dis-
ease will continue to spread.
Education that informs the whole citizenry of their rights is one re-
quirement to successful reform. Latin American countries, however, are
years, if not decades, away from achieving such a condition. The judiciaries
would have a pertinent meaning in the lives of educated and informed citi-
zens. Through education, the judiciaries could, in time, become more re-
spectable, self-sufficient, dynamic, and participatory in representative de-
mocracy.
The judiciary in Latin America has long served the ambitions of politi-
cians seeking to promote political ideologies and personal fortunes.'" In or-
der for the judiciary to be stronger, constraints or safeguards must be
adopted to stop the intrusion of the other political branches into the judici-
ary. Currently, the process of stacking the judiciary with judges of the same
social class and political affiliation creates an oligarchy and assures contin-
ued consolidation of political and economic power from generation to gen-
eration. Judicial reform will not change a centuries-old practice, but rather
gild the practices of corruption and favoritism in a new sheath.
177. Likewise, judicial reform programs may serve the ambitions of judicial reform con-
sultants to promote themselves, to see the world, and earn a very good living in the process.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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